
Final Report
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On May 22, 1997, a bipartisan group of Members of Congress asked us to convene a committee on national tobacco policy. In response to this request, we formed the panel that has met as the Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health. This Committee is composed of representatives of some of the major public health groups that have been leaders in the debate on tobacco control. The selection of organizations to be represented was an especially difficult task, inasmuch as so many highly qualified groups with great expertise are involved in tobacco control; nevertheless, in order to make the Committee of manageable size, we made hard choices to limit the number of members and urged them to consult with a wide range of other organizations and experts.
The Committee has as its mission the development of a comprehensive and rational public health policy toward tobacco, containing clear goals and principles, in order to provide a benchmark against which future public and private activities can be measured.
The Committee has met three times, each time in open session, on June 5, June 18, and June 25. To conduct its work, the Committee resolved itself into five task forces on overlapping topics:
These task forces conferred independently and made their preliminary reports to the Committee. Each report was discussed in open session and amendments were made. Revised reports were developed and summarized.
We believe that this final report speaks loudly for itself, but it is perhaps appropriate for us to note here what this report does not speak to. This is not a report on past actions of the tobacco industry or on the harm that it has done. It is not intended to recommend how tobacco litigation or compensation programs for past injury should be handled. It is not a report on liability for the past.
Rather, in keeping with the Congressional charge, this is a blueprint for the future of tobacco policy and public health. It is neither incremental nor utopian. The plans outlined are ambitious but they can be achieved within a short time.
Most of all, this report is a document intended to look forward, and to move the Nation from its past injuries to future good health. Its recommendations are to ensure complete ability for the FDA to regulate nicotine and tobacco products, to prevent our children from starting to smoke, to treat those already addicted to tobacco, and to protect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to smoke. These are the goals for which all new policy should aim. Any approach that fails these goals fails the Nation and fails the future.
We fully recognize that there are billions of dollars at stake here in hospital bills, compensation, and liability costs. While these are important issues, we believe that this debate about the past should not distract us from solid plans for the future. Not one of those compensatory dollars will be well spent if our children repeat their elders' mistakes, if adults continue their addiction, or if we all have smoke in our faces. As the national debate about tobacco continues, we urge all sides to keep their eyes clearly on this extraordinary opportunity for change.
What follows is a summary of the major recommendations of each of the task forces. An appendix has been included that contains the full final report of each of the task forces.
We want to thank and acknowledge our colleagues who have joined us for this daunting task in such a brief amount of time. We appreciate the expertise, commitment, and labor that have been contributed. We are confident that our work together will change the debate for the better.
| C. Everett Koop, M.D., Sc.D. | David A. Kessler, M.D. |
"[N]icotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco has the same pharmacological effects as other drugs that FDA has traditionally regulated."1 Indeed, it is acknowledged that nicotine is extremely addictive and that "the vast majority of people who use nicotine-containing cigarettes and smokeless tobacco do so to satisfy their craving for the pharmacological effects of nicotine; that is, to satisfy their drug-dependence or addiction."2 Many would argue, therefore, that the regulation of nicotine and its delivery is itself the most essential element of tobacco control activities.
Other components of tobacco smoke are also toxic. The tar, carbon monoxide, and additives contained therein are dangerous to the health of those using tobacco and those around them.
More than 90 percent of people who will ever smoke on a regular basis begin doing so prior to the age of 19. Each day, some 3,000 children take up the habit; the average age at which they begin is approximately 12-1/2, although many decide to smoke earlier if they are able. While these children start to use tobacco for a variety of reasons, very quickly they become addicted to the nicotine present in the product, and studies show clearly that children have just as difficult a time quitting as do adults.
There are a number of reasons why children begin to use tobacco. Among these are the remarkably effective advertising and promotion by the tobacco industry and, for many young people, perceived benefits from the use of tobacco, be they adult privileges, appealing images, or the opportunity for rebelliousness.
Some 50 million Americans are now addicted to tobacco. One of every three long-term users of tobacco will die from a disease related to their tobacco use6 Nicotine, a major constituent of tobacco, is highly addictive and "cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are just as addicting as heroin and cocaine. . . ."7 Similarly, withdrawal from this addiction is like withdrawal from other highly addictive substances. About 70 percent of smokers want to quit, but less than one-quarter are successful in doing so.
The Agency for Health Care Research and Policy has issued smoking cessation clinical practice guidelines8 that lay out recommendations for primary care clinicians, smoking cessation specialists, and health care administrators, insurers, and purchasers. These guidelines are often cited as the framework for providing and evaluating smoking cessation services.
In a separate but related area, it should be noted that cigarette-caused fires are the leading cause of deaths from residential fires. It is argued that many such fires could be prevented by changes that would reduce the burn characteristics of cigarettes.
Second-hand or environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is no longer considered just an unpleasant side effect of cigarette smoking. Scientific evidence now indicates that nonsmokers become seriously ill or die because of exposure to the toxic smoke produced by other people's active smoking and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has classified ETS as an agent known to cause cancer in humans.10 ETS is believed to cause tens of thousands of deaths each year and to cause or exacerbate cardiovascular and pulmonary illnesses in hundreds of thousands additional individuals.
ETS is of particular concern with regard to children. Children are powerless to control their exposure to ETS and yet, because of their young age, are most adversely affected by exposure to this agent. The EPA estimates that exposure to ETS from parental smoking alone causes as many as 300,000 lower respiratory infections per year in infants under the age of 18 months.11
Efforts to control second-hand smoke have been undertaken at Federal, State, and Local levels of government. The Federal government has banned smoking in federally- assisted programs for children and on domestic airline flights. Forty-eight States and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that, in some way, restrict smoking in public places. Local governments have usually led the way in these efforts; over 800 local communities have adopted significant restrictions on smoking in public places and workplaces.
This task force reviewed three basic areas and made recommendations regarding each one. The three areas were: (1) common threads of domestic tobacco control efforts that cut across all other task force recommendations; (2) activities to aid those Americans who will be disadvantaged through no fault of their own by tobacco control policies; and (3) U.S. activities that can assist in tobacco control internationally.
In the first area, it is clear that many of the problems identified by the other four task forces have common sources and potentially common solutions. Most of these task forces made recommendations, for example, opposing peremption of State and local standards. Rather than repeating these proposals in each task force summary, these suggested actions are consolidated here: They should be read to be a part of each task force, unless specific circumstances dictate a narrower approach as reflected in the respective task force summary.
In the second area, this task force reports that tobacco farmers and farm communities are at severe economic risk as comprehensive tobacco control policies take effect. Most Americans consider the tobacco farmer to be as much an economic victim as a participant in the manufacture of tobacco products and support government efforts to help tobacco farmers find other means of making a living.
In the third area, this task force focused on the need for international tobacco policy to which the U.S. could make a substantial contribution. According to the World Health Organization, in the early 1990's, tobacco use caused three million deaths a year worldwide; WHO goes on to project that within the next twenty to thirty years, this number will rise to ten million deaths a year, with 70 percent of those deaths occurring in developing countries. Many of these deaths and projected deaths can be attributed to the increasingly aggressive marketing efforts of U.S.-based transnational tobacco companies.
1 61 Fed. Reg. 168, 44661 (1996).
2Id. at 44636 (comments of the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, and the American Cancer Society).
3In its deliberations, the Advisory Committee recommended that a ten-year plan be established that is at least as strong as the following:
At the end of Reduction target Year 2 15% Year 3 20% Year 4 25% Year 5 30% Year 6 40% Year 7 50% Year 8 55% Year 9 60% Year 10 65% 4 IMPACT grants are administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ASSIST grants are administered by the National Institutes of Health.
5Economic analyses suggest that children's use of tobacco is significantly affected by price increases of $2 per pack or more.
6Coalition on Smoking OR Health, Protecting Our Families and Children from Tobacco: Public Policy Activities of the Coalition on Smoking or Health for 1995 and 1996, 2 (1996).
7Addiction Research Foundation, Facts About Tobacco, 2 (undated)(citing the United States Surgeon General's 1988 Report on Smoking).
8Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Smoking Cessation (Clinical Practice Guideline, Number 18) (1996) (reprinted in 275 J.A.M.A. 16 (April, 24, 1996)).
9Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Smoking Cessation (Clinical Practice Guideline, Number 18) (1996) (reprinted in 275 J.A.M.A. 16 (April, 24, 1996)).
10 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respitory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, (Dec. 1992)(EPA /600/6-90/006F).
12Economic analyses suggest that children's use of tobacco is significantly affected by price increases of $2 per pack or more.
May 22, 1997
Mr. John Garrison
Managing Director, American Lung Association
1740 Broadway
New York, NY 10019
Dear Mr. Garrison:
We are writing as Members of Congress to ask that you serve on an Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health to be chaired by Dr. C. Everett Koop and Dr. David Kessler. The Advisory Committee will advise us on any tobacco settlement that may be proposed and will work with us to develop a comprehensive and united approach to any tobacco legislation that Congress may consider.
In the talks that are now underway, the tobacco industry is seeking a "global settlement" that would provide the industry with limitations on liability, public legitimacy, and sustained economic health. We are concerned that no one has adequately analyzed the ramifications of the tobacco companies' proposals. Before Congress considers any "global settlement" with the tobacco companies, we believe that it is essential that we obtain input from a public health perspective.
We seek your help in this effort. We must not limit our focus to only one part of the tobacco control agenda. In fact, given the unprecedented nature of the relief being discussed by the negotiators for the tobacco industry, the class-action lawyers, and the attorneys general, we believe we should not necessarily limit our focus top provisions tobacco control advocates have proposed in the past. Instead, with your help, we want to ask fundamental questions about what - - from the public health perspective -- the future of the industry should be like.
We will fail our responsibilities if we limit our agenda to the issues currently on the table in the so-called "global settlement" talks. We should look at issues such as reducing tobacco exports, significantly raising tobacco taxes, ensuring actual reductions in youth smoking rates, imposing special corporate responsibilities on the industry, and other important public health policies. We ask for your help in identifying the broad range of provisions that should be encompassed in any "global settlement" with the tobacco industry.
If any agreement is reached in the tobacco settlement talks currently underway, it will undoubtably be closely reviewed and substantially revised by Congress. Indeed, no proposal from outside groups of such a far-reaching nature has ever passed Congress without a great deal of debate and modification. A unified public health position developed by the Advisory Committee will allow us to respond to any weakening amendments effectively -- and to insist on public health amendments to strengthen the legislation.
We are at a turning point in our nation's relationship with the tobacco industry. We hope you will agree to serve on the Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health -- and help us to ensure that any tobacco legislation is in the public health interest of our nation.
Sincerely,
Congressman Henry A. Waxman
Congressman James V. Hanson
Congressman Marty Meehan
Senator Dick Durbin
Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Senator Ron Wyden
Senator Paul Wellstone
Congressman Sherrod Brown
Panel Members
Action on Smoking and Health
John F. Banzhaf III, Executive DirectorAdvocacy Institute
Michael Pertschuk, J.D., Co-DirectorAmerican Academy of Family Physicians
Robert Graham, M.D., Executive Vice PresidentAmerican Academy of Pediatrics
Richard B. Heyman, M.D., Chair, Committee on Substance Abuse
George D. Comerci, M.D., Past President, AAPAmerican Cancer Society
John R. Seffrin, Ph.D., Chief Executive OfficerAmerican College of Chest Physicians
D. Robert McCaffree, M.D., F.C.C.P., President-ElectAmerican College of Preventive Medicine
George K. Anderson, M.D., M.P.H., President-ElectAmerican Heart Association
Dudley H. Hafner, Chief Staff Executive OfficerAmerican Lung Association
John R. Garrison, Chief Executive OfficerAmerican Medical Association
Nancy Dickey, M.D., President-Elect
Randolph Smoak, Jr., M.D., Vice-Chair, Board of TrusteesAmerican Medical Women's Association
Eileen McGrath, J.D., C.A.E., Executive DirectorAmerican Public Health Association
Mohammad N. Akhter, M.D., M.P.H., Executive DirectorAmericans for Nonsmokers' Rights
Julia Carol, Co-DirectorAssociation of State and Territorial Health Officials
Donald E. Williamson, M.D., President-Elect
Martin Wasserman, M.D., Maryland Secretary of HealthMaine Department of Human Services, Bureau of Health
Randy H. Schwartz, M.S.P.H., Director, Division of Community and Family HealthNational Center for Tobacco-Free Kids
William D. Novelli, President
Matthew L. Myers, J.D., Executive Vice PresidentNational Medical Association
Randall C. Morgan, M.D., President
Yvonnechris Smith Veal, M.D., Past PresidentThe Onyx Group
Rev. Jesse W. Brown, Jr., M. Div., Vice PresidentPartnership for Prevention
Jonathan E. Fielding, M.D., M.P.H., M.B.A., Vice-ChairScience and Public Policy Institute
Jeff Nesbit, PresidentSmokeless States National Program
Thomas P. Houston, M.D., Director of Smokeless States National Program OfficeStop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco
Judy Sopenski, M.Ed., Executive DirectorTobacco Products Liability Project
Richard A. Daynard, J.D., Ph.D., President, Tobacco Control Resource Center;
Chairman, Tobacco Products Liability Project
Task Force on the Regulation of Nicotine and Tobacco Products:
- American Cancer Society (John Seffrin—Chair)
- National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids (William Novelli/Matthew Myers)
- Stop Teenage Addition to Tobacco (Judy Sopenski)
- Tobacco Products Liability Project (Richard Daynard)
Task Force on Youth and Tobacco:
- American Academy of Pediatrics (Richard Heyman—Chair)
- American Academy of Family Physicians (Robert Graham)
- American Cancer Society (John Seffrin)
- American College of Chest Physicians (Robert McCaffree)
- American Public Health Association (Katherine McCarter for Mohammed Akhter)
- Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (Donald Williamson)
- National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids (William Novelli)
- National Medical Association (Yvonnechris Veal for Randall Morgan)
- Partnership for Prevention (Jonathan Fielding)
- Smokeless States National Program (Thomas Houston)
- Stop Teenage Addition to Tobacco (Judy Sopenski)
Task Force on Current Users of Tobacco Products:
- American Medical Association (Randolph Smoak for Nancy Dickey—Chair)
- American Academy of Family Physicians (Robert Graham)
- American Academy of Pediatrics (Richard Heyman)
- American College of Chest Physicians (Robert McCaffree)
- American College of Preventive Medicine (George Anderson)
- National Medical Association (Yvonnechris Veal for Randall Morgan)
- The Onyx Group (Jesse Brown)
- Smokeless States National Program (Thomas Houston)
Task Force on Environmental Tobacco Smoke:
- American Lung Association (John Garrison—Chair)
- Action on Smoking and Health (John Banzhaf)
- American College of Preventive Medicine (George Anderson)
- American Heart Association (Dudley Hafner)
- American Public Health Association (Katherine McCarter for Mohammed Akhter)
- Americans for Non-smokers Rights (Julia Carol)
- Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (Donald Williamson)
Task Force on the Future of the Tobacco Industry and Tobacco Control Efforts:
- Advocacy Institute (Michael Pertschuk—Chair)
- American Heart Association (Dudley Hafner)
- American Lung Association (John Garrison)
- American Medical Association (Randolph Smoak for Nancy Dickey)
- Americans for Non-smokers Rights (Julia Carol)
- National Center for Tobacco Free Kids (Matthew Myers)
- The Onyx Group (Jesse Brown)
- Partnership for Prevention (Jonathan Fielding)
- Tobacco Products Liability Project (Richard Daynard)
Jeff Nesbit, Staff Director
Timothy M. Westmoreland, J.D., Counsel
Ruth J. Katz, J.D., M.P.H., Counsel
Michael D. Beauvais, Legal Associate
R. Scott Foster, J.D., Legal Associate
Susan E. O'Donnell, M.A., Public Affairs
Martha Ross, Senior Program Associate
Mary Supley, Public Affairs
This report establishes public health benchmarks developed by the Subcommittee on Nicotine and Product Regulation. This compilation is not all inclusive, but rather a summary of the most serious concerns expressed by committee members to date with the advice and consent of nationally recognized experts:
With 50 million addicted tobacco users and other Americans who are impacted by smoking, the health policy developed through legislation, settlement, or regulation must address the needs of this population. Aside from compensation issues, these people will need help and funds from the industry should pay for their treatment. The FDA must have the authority to regulate nicotine, but not just in the context of future addicts. Any solution that does not address the needs of current users is inadequate. The costs and administration of a program to assist with this population must be coordinated with Federal, State, and Local agencies. It must be systematic and available throughout the country. Principles of a cessation program include:
Much has been documented about the addictive qualities of nicotine, and the focus on the drug and its delivery device is the basis for FDA assertion of jurisdiction. Yet regulation of the myriad other constituents and ingredients has been less prevalent in the discussion of FDA authority. Full FDA authority in the regulation of nicotine is not sufficient. The authority to regulate, disclose, and if necessary prohibit other constituents and ingredients must be addressed in any public health policy. Tobacco additives, carcinogens, dyes, product enhancers, and preservatives all play a key role in the cigarette as a delivery device and must be scrutinized in addition to nicotine. Nicotine makes the product addictive, the toxins make it deadly, and the additives make it more consumer acceptable, like sweetening a poison. While the current FDA rules may not hold sway over each of these content areas, any regulatory scheme should include the consideration of these critical cigarette components. ETS and the OSHA regulations cannot be excluded in a comprehensive plan which assures protection of workers, children, and the public.
The authority to regulate cannot be construed as tantamount to regulating. Enforcement of regulation is a key component to any FDA action. Granting the FDA the right to regulate content, nicotine levels, and other ingredients must be coupled with the funds to do so. Ancillary FDA regulatory issues: labeling, disclosure of content, manufacturing, and marketing should be included in any public health policy. Other specific recommendations include:
Pragmatic consideration of FDA regulation roll out and enforcement should be addressed in a meaningful way. One option: to assign an arbitrary trigger for further restriction (a set number of years before agency can ban nicotine.) Yet another option: establish a standard of proof and mechanism of discovery necessary before FDA can take additional action. A realistic plan should be developed. The consensus of the committee:
The need for full disclosure of both scientific and market data is necessary not only by the industry, but its associations, law firms, and service providers to the extent that such information will ensure complete and effective product regulation. Research on the health effects of the product, on why people initiate use, on the effects of marketing must be disclosed. All industry based research should be made available to the FDA for review. Data on ETS and its impact on the non smoker should be turned over as well. Penalties, both civil and criminal, for nondisclosure should be developed. A mechanism for document production must be adopted and could also serve as a trigger for additional FDA action.
The framework for regulation should bring to market less dangerous products and expose known science regarding "less hazardous" alternative delivery systems in full public view. But, in the broader context, a review of the requirements of all nicotine delivery devices, including pharmaceutical devices, is necessary to ensure the standard for cigarettes will achieve maximum overall reduction in disease rather than continue to give regulatory advantages compared to less toxic forms of nicotine delivery. State and local jurisdictional issues and antitrust considerations must be addressed in the context of the regulatory framework. The regulation of the tobacco industry should be on par with all other producers of regulated drugs. The regulatory framework must create an environment which yields less hazardous products and a reduced public health impact of tobacco use. Safety should be measured on the societal as well as the individual level.
While international regulatory issues are not the primary purview of the FDA, consideration of the world market and the effects of US regulation deserves examination. Restricting Federal agencies from assisting tobacco companies internationally, reviewing funding and research support for the WHO, and considering compacts protecting developing countries from unfair and deceptive trade are beginning components of international regulation. Production of tobacco abroad by domestic corporations should be addressed to both protect world health and ensure US regulation contributes to that end.
The strongest health policy will treat currently addicted Americans, fund research in order to develop the less hazardous alternative nicotine delivery systems, give FDA immediate authority to regulate all areas of nicotine, other constituents, and ingredients, disclose all industry information regarding all aspects of the product including pricing and market data, build a regulatory framework that is equitable and consistent with all nicotine devices, and is mindful of the international implications of domestic regulation.
Through each of these components is the overarching need to fund each aspect of this policy. Without adequate funding: regulation, research, disclosure, prevention, and treatment will not be possible. Whether these issues are addressed by regulation, legislation, or settlement: the tobacco industry will have to pay for the damage its product has inflicted on the American public. In the context of this subcommittees charge, that means the industry must fully fund these policies. Anything less is not acceptable.
More than ninety percent of people who will ever smoke on a regular basis begin doing so prior to the age of nineteen. Each day some 3,000 children take up the habit, and the average age at which they begin is about 12-1/2. While these children begin to use tobacco for a variety of reasons, they very quickly become addicted to the nicotine present in the product and studies show clearly that children have just as difficult a time quitting as do adults. Furthermore, the exposure of children to environmental tobacco smoke creates major health hazards for this age group just as it does for adults.
There are a number of reasons why children begin to use tobacco. Some perceive it as "normal," thanks in part to the media's portrayal of tobacco use. Some identify it as an adult privilege, and use it as a way to be more adult-like. Many are influenced by the barrage of advertising that depicts tobacco users as sexy, popular, "cool," macho, independent, sexy, thin and successful and feel that by using a particular brand they can incorporate these images as well. Some see tobacco use as a legal risky behavior that allows them to appear rebellious and "tough" without directly flouting the law. Others simply take up tobacco use because they are bored or their friends are doing it and they want to be "part of the crowd." The clever and accurate research conducted by the industry over the years has led to remarkably effective advertising and promotion which, in turn, has created for many young people a perceived value to the use of tobacco. Given that tobacco harms one's health, costs money, is offensive to others and fosters chemical dependency, there really is no true value to its use, save perhaps to the tobacco industry.
The nation's long term policy must focus intently on youth uptake and attack the problem from every possible angle. Advertising and promotion must be eliminated. The industry must be regulated, access controlled, excise taxes increased and price supports removed. The public must be educated about the true addictiveness and dangers of tobacco use, and outcome studies must be conducted to monitor the success of our prevention efforts.
Promotion and marketing of nicotine-containing products (cigarettes, cigars, snuff, smokeless and pipe tobacco) by the tobacco industry has been extremely successful through such methods as advertising, accessibility, product placement in movies and television, event sponsorship and enticing graphics on packaging. By purposefully targeting adolescents and young adults, women, and special populations, the industry has been able to replace those who quit and the over 400,000 smokers who die each year from tobacco-related causes.
Adolescents are particularly susceptible to tobacco advertising as they strive for autonomy and social acceptance, and work toward an identity of their own. Young people evaluate advertising messages indirectly with their emotions as opposed to making logical analyses of its content. The billions of advertising dollars spent by the tobacco industry have been disproportionately successful with teenagers. (Reference: American Psychological Association comment. Fed Reg. 1996;61:44396-44468)
It is essential that there be well-funded, effective and sustained educational programs for youth, parents, and the public in schools, in homes, in health care offices and hospitals, in the community and in the media.
There are a number of tenets that must be included in effective public education programs. These include: child-centered family-focused efforts; long-term and repeated prevention and intervention strategies; age appropriate, developmentally appropriate, and culturally sensitive content; increasing social competency such as communication skills, peer relationships, self-efficacy, assertiveness, critical thinking skills, media literacy, and other protective factors. Religious and "community-specific" organizations, businesses, government, schools, and other community organizations must play an active and visible role in strengthening the norms against tobacco use.
Industry
Schools
Community Programs
Health Professionals
Data indicate that children and youths are more price-sensitive than adults, and that pricing has a strong and immediate impact on reducing sales of tobacco products overall. Increasing the price puts a higher barrier between youths and easy access (affordability) to the products, and therefore between youths and sustained tobacco use. A number of studies suggest that a two dollar increase in the price of a package of cigarettes will lead to a fifty percent reduction in teen use. Thus, this barrier will delay the initiation and reduce the number of new tobacco users. (IOM Rpt. 1994) "In economic terms, improved health and life-years saved is valued at from $28 to $43 billion per year." (Kessler, et al, PEDIATRICS June 1997, pp 884- 887)
Tobacco products have been consistently exempted from coverage under consumer safety, food and drug legislation, and as a result have been largely unregulated. This lack of regulation stands in stark contrast to other products that have far less disastrous long-term health implications than the use of tobacco products such as over-the-counter drugs. (IOM Rept. 1994)
Youth tobacco use is a complex, multi-faceted problem which requires an intense research agenda which goes beyond reducing access and restricting advertising. Youth live in families and communities where they are exposed to the dangers of environmental tobacco smoke at home, in restaurants, in public buildings and other places in the community. The acceptability of tobacco use among children and teens may be fostered by parents, siblings, other family members, adult role models, friends and peers. Strategies to change these social norms must be developed and evaluated.
Reducing the prevalence of tobacco use is vital to subsequent reductions in morbidity and mortality from tobacco use, currently the leading cause of death in America. The World Health Organization projects that, by the year 2025, 10 million people annually will die of tobacco-related diseases; it should be noted that this projection counts only current tobacco users. Helping current tobacco users stop not only promises to reduce the severity of the tobacco pandemic, but also will reduce the onset of smoking by youth, as they change their beliefs about tobacco use as the norm in society.
At the outset, the subcommittee recognizes that a wide definition of the population of tobacco users should be dealt with in this report, and that this discussion and the recommendations refer to persons who smoke cigarettes, cigars, pipes, and "roll-your-own" products, as well as those who use smokeless tobacco products. The report is divided into the following sections:
The subcommittee recognizes that excellent clinical guidelines on smoking cessation have been produced by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research; other groups such as the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American Medical Association, and the National Cancer Institute have also produced materials that have been very useful for clinicians in helping patients stop smoking. These guidelines should become a cornerstone of clinical practice, and tobacco use cessation should become a routine part of care.
We recognize that a variety of barriers to this goal exist, including education of clinicians, medical office systems that are not geared to providing clinical preventive services, and coverage of tobacco use cessation services by insurance, among others. A discussion of some of these follows; however, a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this report.
Although primary prevention in tobacco use is crucial, current tobacco users must be informed as to the need to stop tobacco use and to seek help in cessation, using the most powerful means available. Behavior change is the goal, and creating public demand for and acceptance of tobacco use cessation is key in the effort to forge such changes.
As important as the measures outlined above are to the individual tobacco user, societal norms must also change in order to support and encourage cessation. Public attitudes about tobacco use are key in this regard. Tobacco sales in pharmacies, for example, sends mixed messages to the public, particularly youth, about tobacco and health. Pharmacies should stop selling tobacco products, as one of several strategies to change the consumer culture related to tobacco use. As this applies to cessation, the public must understand that tobacco use is not a matter of "sin," that failure to stop use is not lack of "will power," and that tobacco use cessation is not an impossible task.
Among environmental issues, specific areas include the following:
Well-funded research is essential to solving the personal health, medical care delivery, and public health problems related to tobacco use. Several areas of research pertain to cessation, and should target therapies and standards for nicotine dependence interventions that establish their validity and effectiveness.
Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) has been classified as a Group A (known human) carcinogen by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This classification is traditionally reserved for the most dangerous of cancer-causing agents, including asbestos, benzene and radon. In its landmark 1992 risk assessment, Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, EPA estimated that 3,000 lung cancers deaths per year in nonsmokers are attributable to ETS. Similarly, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in their Current Intelligence Bulletin 51 found ETS to be a potential occupational carcinogen, the agency's most significant warning. In addition, the American Heart Association estimates that ETS is responsible for up to 60,000 deaths yearly from cardiovascular disease. Moreover, tens of millions of American have medical conditions, including asthma, bronchitis, emphysema, allergies, sinusitis, rhinitis, and laryngitis which cause them to suffer very severe and often-life threatening reactions upon exposure to ETS.
The Committee is particularly concerned about the effect of ETS on children. Children are powerless to control their exposure to ETS and yet they are the group most adversely affected by exposure. Children are at risk simply because they are young--they take in more air (and more pollution) relative to their body weight and lung surface area, their lungs are still developing and their biologic defenses against pollution are not fully mature. ETS exposure is associated with additional episodes and increased severity of symptoms in children with asthma. ETS exposure exacerbates symptoms in approximately 20 percent of this country's 4.8 million asthmatic children. The EPA estimates that exposure to ETS from parental smoking causes 150,000 to 300,000 lower respiratory tract infections per year in children under 18 months of age, resulting in 7,500 to 15,000 hospitalizations. Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, the leading cause of death in infants between one month and one year of age, has been linked to exposure to ETS.
Federal, State, and Local governments as well as the courts have all provided important protections for nonsmokers.
Each level of government can make unique contributions to protection for nonsmokers. The goal of any such regulation is to change the behavior of smokers in order to eliminate the exposure of nonsmokers to ETS by prohibiting smoking, and it is the effectiveness of a given regulatory approach in actually changing smokers' behavior, rather than simply the comprehensiveness of regulations enacted, that determines the extent of protection provided nonsmokers. The effectiveness of any law in changing the behavior of smokers is heavily influenced by the norms for expected behavior among smokers and nonsmokers, by the support and peer enforcement within a given community, and by the awareness of smokers and nonsmokers that the "rules" have changed.
In determining where to direct efforts to regulate smoking, the following issues must be considered:
The Committee believes that all Americans are entitled to a smoke free environment. The Committee recommends that Federal/State/Local legislation and regulations be enacted to protect all Americans from the physical irritation, disease, disability and death attributable to ETS. Accomplishing this goal will also require renewed education efforts to increase the public awareness of the health effects of exposure to ETS.
To accomplish these goals, the committee recommends the following:
Tobacco control advocates, the State Attorneys General, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, private tort claimants in class actions and in individual cases, and state and local legislative initiatives have brought a wide and effective range of forces to bear on the tobacco industry. After thirty years of virtually unconstrained marketing abuses, subversion of public health regulation, and anti-democratic political activities, these forces have at last placed the industry on the defensive.
These forces include not only the first judicially sustained assertion of comprehensive tobacco regulatory authority by a Federal agency, but the high promise of pending civil litigation. They include the emerging strength and moral authority of the tobacco control movement and the eruption of public antipathy towards the tobacco industry -- the product of unprecedented mass media coverage and exposure of tobacco industry wrongdoing.
The President and Congress need to be fully mindful of the actual and potential benefits from, as well as the limitations of, the forces at work under existing law.
It is the Committee's firm conviction that the White House and Congress must assure the continuity of those forces which remain essential counterweights to the economic and political power of the tobacco industry.
This requires:
Such funding must be structured to assure such programs will be as free as possible from tobacco industry and political censorship or constraints, including the freedom to advocate the enactment of tobacco control policies, to expose tobacco industry wrongdoing and to challenge the failure of government entities to carry out the law, whether the funds are allocated to government agencies, such as state health departments, or to non-government organizations.
One potential approach: a portion of available funds flowing into a trust administered, as in the Australian model, by a state-chartered, but independent, state Health Foundation, governed by a board composed of the leaders of health and other non-government organizations who are not recipients of funding.
There must be a waiver of any claims of attorney-client and work-product privilege for any documents except those recently created, since those privileges have been seriously abused and any information that may have been properly privileged is unlikely to continue to be sensitive (or even relevant in litigation) now.
Tobacco farmers and farm communities will be at severe economic risk should comprehensive tobacco control policies be enacted and take full effect. Most Americans consider the tobacco farmer as much an economic victim as perpetrator of tobacco-related disease, and support Federal government efforts to help farmers find other ways of making a living. The Committee therefore supports:
According to the World Health Organization, tobacco use is estimated to have caused around 3 million deaths a year worldwide in the early 1990s, and is projected to cause ten million deaths a year worldwide by the 2020s or early 2030s, with 70 percent of those deaths occurring in developing countries. Many of these deaths will result from the increasingly aggressive marketing efforts of U.S.-based transnational tobacco companies.
The adoption of comprehensive national legislation governing tobacco will constitute a national finding that no civilized society can do less to stem the toll of disease and death from tobacco use. Since the marketing abuses which the U.S. seeks to control at home are practiced without restraint abroad -- by U.S.-based companies -- the U.S. government has both a public health and a moral obligation to do all within its power to see that the protections it extends to its own citizens are extended to all.
This must include adherence to the following principles:
Both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government can do much, within reason, to promote these principles and bring about worldwide adoption of tobacco manufacturing and marketing standards at least as comprehensive and stringent as those enforced within the United States.
Key measures include:
Tobacco control advocates, the State Attorneys General, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, private tort claimants in class actions and in individual cases, and state and local legislative initiatives have brought a wide and effective range of forces to bear on the tobacco industry. After thirty years of virtually unconstrained marketing abuses, subversion of public health regulation, and anti-democratic political activities, these forces have at last placed the industry on the defensive.
These forces include not only the first judicially sustained assertion of comprehensive tobacco regulatory authority by a Federal agency, but the high promise of pending civil litigation. They include the emerging strength and moral authority of the tobacco control movement and the eruption of public antipathy towards the tobacco industry -- the product of unprecedented mass media coverage and exposure of tobacco industry wrongdoing.
These forces have been and remain an essential counterweight to the vast array of economic and political abuses which the tobacco industry and its allies continue to commit: lobbying excesses; gross campaign financing largess; public relations distortions and propaganda; seductive political advertising; the co-opting of communities through promotional supports; the propping up with cash infusions to phony fronts; the buying of corrupt science; the perversion of philanthropy to buy the silence of those desperate for resources; and the abuse of processes designed to serve basic citizen interests, such as "SLAP" law suits and the use of Freedom of Information Act demands as instruments of intimidation.
So, before embracing any proposed legislation which purports to offer a comprehensive framework for tobacco control, the President and Congress need to be fully mindful of the actual and potential benefits from, as well as the limitations of, the forces at work under existing law.
It is the Task Force's firm conviction that no legislation should be supported which does not assure the continuity of those forces which must remain essential counterweights to the economic and political power of the tobacco industry.
Therefore, this report first assesses the current and potential impact of pending civil litigation on tobacco control, the present and future role of the tobacco control movement, and the effect of sustained mass media focus on tobacco industry wrongdoing. It looks at the likely consequences for each of these forces if legislation which otherwise meets the standards elsewhere set forth in this blueprint are met. The report also examines the implications of comprehensive legislation for international tobacco control, and the reasonable economic conversion needs of tobacco farmers and others.
By the mid 1990's the nation's tobacco control movement was beginning to come of age as a powerful advocacy force for tobacco control policy and an effective counterweight to the tobacco lobby. This is a movement which has now welded together layer upon layer of diverse citizen organizations and public health authorities. At its foundation are the laser-beam-focused local non-smokers rights groups and the great national voluntary health associations -- Cancer, Heart, Lung -- who reach out to their millions of volunteers with increasingly energetic and effective calls to action on public policy issues relating to tobacco.
In turn, these groups have joined forces against the tobacco lobby with medical and scientific organizations, consumer advocates, education and children's advocates. And they have been newly committed and successful in reaching out and drawing into partnership ethnic minority and women's advocacy organizations.
To the energy of citizen volition has been added the fuel of new outside resources to build a movement infrastructure -- though still far less than the profits tobacco companies gain from illicit sales to children. But, for now, there is substantial funding and professional staff support for broad state citizen coalitions from the National Cancer Institute, the Centers for Disease Control, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and others, and, by ballot initiative, directly from the voters of California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Arizona.
And what essential functions do these groups and coalitions perform? They are visible across the spectrum, from apolitical public health education campaigns, which keep a public focus on America's "brown plague," to the wildfire spread of grass roots community campaigns for local clean indoor air ordinances and billboard and vending machine bans -- laws which can count on community support in enforcement because they are born of community engagement.
At the state legislatures, where tobacco lobbyists burrow in, these coalitions have exposed and overcome the tobacco lobby's stealthy efforts to gain enactment of weak laws that preempt strong local action -- and they have launched successful statewide campaigns to raise cigarette excise taxes, most recently in Alaska, boosting the state tax to $1.00 a pack, highest in the nation.
At all levels of government, these watchdog coalitions track and expose tobacco campaign contributions, tobacco lobbyists, and ethically compromised government officials and law- makers. And after they succeed in promoting sound laws and regulations, and the focus of public attention shifts, the advocates and the coalitions remain to make sure enforcement matches promise.
But perhaps the greatest achievement of the tobacco control movement in the last decade has been its triumph in mass media advocacy -- in skillfully assuring in a hundred different ways, with a hundred different stories -- that tobacco industry fraud, deceit, conspiracy, and corruption has occupied prime space and prime time in the national news media. To be sure, this task has been amply abetted by tobacco industry whistle blowers, leaked documents, active Congressional oversight (until 1995), campaign financing reporting, and the systematic unearthing of revealing secret industry documents through the litigation discovery process.
But the frequency of such stories and their spotlight on industry wrongdoing owe much to the media advocacy skills of tobacco control advocates - both through strategic approaches to the news media and reinforcement through selective paid advertising. This media effect can be seen clearly in polling data which show dramatic increases in public recognition of tobacco as an addictive drug, public belief that tobacco companies deliberately target kids in their ads, and public support for criminal prosecution of tobacco executives for lying to Congress.
This focus of public opprobrium helps explain why this Congress, despite huge tobacco industry campaign contributions, has thus far been inhibited from attempting to enact what the tobacco industry has eagerly sought: legislation eviscerating FDA's asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products -- and legislation shielding the tobacco industry from liability under cover of "tort reform." The tobacco industry no doubt fears, too, that prospective jurors, who have been reluctant to hold tobacco companies accountable, may now be among the majorities who view them more negatively than before. So the storm of media criticism, in reinforcing greatly the threat of ruinous litigation and punitive damages, has driven the tobacco industry to the bargaining table and towards accepting demands that exceed the most optimistic policy goals of public health advocates just a few years ago.
There is also reason to believe that the continuous media coverage of the litigation and other investigative disclosures of tobacco industry practices, including the effect of future jury findings of industry culpability in civil, as well as possible criminal trials, will have a direct public health benefit in changing peoples' attitudes towards tobacco use, and, eventually, their behavior.
It is, of course, uncertain that current levels of media attention on tobacco and tobacco company behavior will continue indefinitely under existing conditions -- at some point the media may run out of newsworthy revelations, at least as to past misbehavior. And, at some point, other issues and stories will gain attention and dominate the news.
But a comprehensive legislated "settlement" -- even legislation that meets the regulatory standards set forth in other parts of the Committee report -- will threaten the virtual disappearance of such media coverage. It will do so for two reasons:
So the enactment of a comprehensive blueprint of substantive provisions for tobacco control, as delineated by the other Task Forces, will not be sufficient unless there are also provisions to assure the continuation of a vigorous, adequately funded tobacco control movement and infrastructure.
Unless that happens, the tobacco industry will be relatively free to revert to undermining tobacco control policies through its lobbying practices quietly and out of the spotlight -- a major setback for the public health. This will be doubly true if there is no fundamental reform of campaign financing laws which have allowed the tobacco companies grossly to tilt the electoral and legislative process against the unfunded public interest in preventive health.
Unless the settlement legislation provides for adequate funding to sustain the nation's tobacco control infrastructure, the vital local grass roots organizations will be parched for basic resources, and we will have rendered the national tobacco control movement an emaciated watchdog, inadequate to keep pressure on regulators to regulate vigorously, politicians to focus on public health rather than campaign money, and the tobacco lobby from renewing its dirty work.
We wouldn't be where we are today without the power of litigation. The individual actions by smokers and their families began the process, starting the trickle of evidence that is now becoming a tidal wave. Cippolone, although eventually dropped, deeply probed the use of third parties to hide the mounting evidence of harm from smoking, and the Supreme Court knocked out enough of the preemption defenses to enable others to come back and fight another day. Sean Marsee lost his suit over smokeless tobacco, but the court case brought a whole new awareness that smokeless was not harmless. Castano, in which the class was decertified, hung around long enough to rally the trial lawyers and to start to shift the momentum. The flight attendants' class action is paving new roads for victims of secondhand smoke, and the state class actions and the Medicaid suits by the State attorneys general are what has brought the industry to the bargaining table. And all of this has occurred without the industry paying a single penny to any plaintiff.
Of course, the ultimate goal of these and other lawsuits is to recover billions of dollars from the tobacco industry, either in the form of direct payments to individuals, the states, or others, or establishing and funding programs to deal with those who are already addicted and to educate our youth about the dangers of tobacco. Some day, in the not-too-distant future, there may be payments, perhaps modest at the start, but ever increasing in amounts, whether by judgments or settlements, and eventually, unless Congress steps in, everyone who has been injured by tobacco will have the opportunity to take their case to court and try to prove their damages.
However, on a more cautionary note, it is well to remember that only one successful liability lawsuit filed on behalf of a smoker has yet been prosecuted, and that over time, as juries deem smokers fully informed of the hazards of tobacco use and the unreliability of any representations by the industry, juries may be even less likely to sympathize with tobacco users. In any event it may well be years before even initially successful litigation can begin to change tobacco companies' behavior on such matters as marketing.
In the meantime, the litigation process will go forward, and with every day, the public will learn more and more of the industry's misdeeds and of the means that it devised to hook our young. Unlike legislative hearings and agency proceedings, where subpoena power is either lacking or rarely used, the industry must both respond to specific allegations by taking a position -- if you thought tobacco was not dangerous, how could you have adequately warned the public if it turned out to be harmful ? -- and disclose its documents and produce its witnesses, at least eventually. Not only does the public become aware of the truth, but attitudes change -- about tobacco addiction and the inability of many people to quit, no matter how hard they try, about marketing directed at kids, about the use of industry fronts and law firms to cover up damaging research, and about the industry's deliberate manipulation of the levels of nicotine to assure continued use of tobacco -- without which juries will not side with victims, and legislators will learn that the public will no longer countenance their taking money from Big Tobacco and doing its bidding.
The process of litigation is far from running its course. Even if the industry were to fully fund all the programs anyone can imagine, including compensating all of its victim (which it will never agree to do), the process should continue until all the facts are out and the American people truly understand the magnitude of the wrongdoing that has taken place. The Federal government also must be allowed to continue its criminal investigations so that individuals and corporations that violated the law are held accountable as well. And if the evidence shows the kind of outrageous conduct for which the law awards punitive damages, as surely seems to be the case, those claims must not be cut off by legislative fiat, not only because doing that would allow the industry to escape liability, but because it would make it far more difficult to respond to similar pleas for leniency from other businesses, most of whose wrongdoing pales by comparison with that of the tobacco companies.
There is another category of lawsuits that is vital to the long-term health of the tobacco control movement. Today, the FDA is run by individuals who are dedicated to preventing tobacco from addicting our youth and killing those that are already addicted. But that will not always be the case. Like all regulators, the FDA has been guilty of industry capture in the past, and it would be a miracle if that phenomenon did not repeat itself for tobacco at some time in the future. Therefore, to protect the public, the law must provide for citizens suits against the FDA, with attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs to assure that these cases are brought since there is no money in them for trial lawyers. Similarly, when the inevitable industry resistance to new FDA regulations arises, funding must be available to non-profit public health advocates to assure that they are heard at the agency and in the courts. Simply knowing that citizens are there, watching over FDA, ready and able to go to court to enforce the agency's duties upon it, may not be enough to prevent all FDA backsliding, but it may make resort to litigation less necessary.
Lawsuits are means to achieve ends, in tobacco control as elsewhere. The measure of a lawsuit's importance is not limited to the bottom line of who won, who lost, and how much. The Supreme Court has recognized that litigation is an activity protected by the First Amendment, because it is a form of political expression and one of the essential means by which our citizens petition their government for a redress of grievances. It is often messy and unpleasant, but it has been and must continue to be a vital tool in the tobacco control movement.
The most significant current litigation is one that most tobacco control advocates never dreamed would be brought: the industry is challenging the authority of the FDA for its rules issued in August 1996 that would, for the first time, provide meaningful regulation over tobacco products. The first round was largely won by FDA, even though the industry hand-picked the judge, but the case being appealed over two issues: whether the FDA has the authority to treat tobacco products as drugs and medical devices and whether it has the authority to issue rules governing advertising directed at children. There is reason for guarded optimism (even including the First Amendment issues that have yet to be addressed), but the courts could strike down the entire effort.
Current litigation against the tobacco industry might have a range of impacts, but the two most important to consider are at the extremes: the companies might win almost all of the major cases, or the industry might lose those cases in a way to cause either or both Philip Morris or RJR to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. A result in the middle is unlikely to alter the current dynamics of tobacco control significantly.
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of success, including what size judgments might be awarded, in any of the major cases without a detailed review of the evidence (which is largely under seal or not disclosed) and of the law, which varies from state to state and among the three basic types of actions (Medicaid, statewide class-action, and individual suits). There is also the inevitable unpredictability of juries and the fact that the Mississippi case will be tried to a judge, not a jury. Even if the information were available, along with the time to do the analysis, case- by-case predictions are fraught with difficulty. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that, among the individual cases, some plaintiffs will prevail, but that overall their success is unlikely to bring the industry to its knees, largely because juries have very skeptical of these claims, as mentioned above.
While an assessment of the class actions and Medicaid suits is little more than an educated guess, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which either extreme results. The presence of the industry at the bargaining table suggests that it is concerned about both types of cases, in large part because it rather than the individual smoker will be the focus of the litigation and because there is now so much evidence of the industry's knowledge and cover-up of tobacco's dangers. Still, the industry has very able lawyers, and the cases are not easy, on the facts or the law. Moreover, counsel for the states and the class plaintiffs must know that even if they were awarded astronomical actual or punitive damages, that were upheld on appeal, the companies could go into Chapter 11, which would tie the matter up for years, and make it impossible for the plaintiffs (and their lawyers) ever to get paid anywhere near what they were awarded.
On the other hand, despite its threats, there are several reasons why the industry is very unlikely to go into Chapter 11 unless the situation becomes dramatically worse. First, a company loses much of its freedom and of its control over access to its files. There will be an examination, and it is possible that a trustee would be appointed who would be able to waive various privileges the company might have.
Second, although it is possible to sell non-tobacco parts of a company while in Chapter 11, the court must approve the sale, which includes asking whether the creditors will be as well off with the proceeds rather than keeping the operating entity. (If such a sale took place now, the proceeds could be passed onto the stockholders, but any buyer at this time would have to be very concerned about the possibility of successor liability, a risk that is reduced under Chapter 11.)
Third, going into bankruptcy puts the company in play, which means that someone could come in and buy it all, leaving management without jobs, perks etc. Fourth, it is not at all clear that Chapter 11 could rid the company of claims from smokers who are not yet sick, let alone from those who will start/continue to smoke in the future, assuming the company continues in the tobacco business. There is also some possibility that the Court might curtail some of the company's lobbying or issue/product advertising, but only if someone could convince the Court that it was better for the creditors (including smoking victims) to do so.
Furthermore, once Chapter 11 is sought, existing creditors cannot collect a penny until a plan to settle all claims has been confirmed, which would take many years. In short there are many reasons why Chapter 11 will not be attractive for anyone, which makes it likely that, before that point is reached, everyone will see the need for a settlement of the major litigations, perhaps on an individual or group basis, because there is too much to risk on both sides. This does not mean that a settlement will necessarily come soon or that it will go beyond money issues, which for the class actions could include establishing smoking cessation programs and other ancillary relief.
From a tobacco control perspective, one advantage of a settlement (with a consent order injunction) plus legislation, rather than just legislation, is that having the industry agree to limitations on aggressive marketing practices avoids the chance of a First Amendment challenge. Thus, billboard operators or the media could not sue since the consent order would prevent all U.S. companies from advertising even if the legislative restrictions were struck down. There remains the possibility of a non-U.S. company, not subject to any consent orders, coming into the U.S. market and replicating what the U.S. industry did in the past by buying and rejuvenating old domestic brands. One fairly easy way to discourage this is to make sure that the court orders apply to anyone who acquires any tobacco company or any right to make a product or use a trademark of that company.
The more difficult situation to confront would involve a wholly foreign company and its products. Such a company would have to plan to make a massive investment in advertising and promotion (assuming that the media would be willing to carry tobacco ads for non-U.S. tobacco companies) and would have to conclude that its costly advertising would benefit its sales, and not primarily those of its existing U.S. competitors. In addition, it would have to bring and win a lawsuit to overturn the statutes that would replicate the court orders, a result that seems unlikely for most of the rules that are likely to be imposed. Congress could also impose tariffs on non- complying companies that can create major barriers to entry, assuming that GATT and various treaties do not forbid them. Therefore, although there are steps that must be taken to guard against a major non-U.S. tobacco invasion, the likelihood that foreign products will undermine tobacco control is small.
One of the principal concerns about any possible "global" settlement at this time is that many of the key facts are not yet public. Counsel for the states and the class action plaintiffs may have enough information to make informed judgments about the extent of the industry's wrongdoing and the type of relief needed to remedy it, but the public does not because much of that information is still under seal. Continuation of litigation would help assure that this information came out at trial, although some of it may not because of relevance or privilege claims. Any legislation and settlement must make certain that all such information is fully disclosed to the public.
Except for efforts made in recent years, and following some ground breaking efforts by President Jimmy Carter and the Carter Center in 1985, the public health community has all but ignored the tobacco farmer and the difficult situation that many of the tobacco farmers have found themselves in. The public health community has to a large extent viewed the farmers as part of the tobacco "family" carrying out the political agenda of the tobacco companies. Although the farmers have often defended the industry and the production and marketing of tobacco, their motivations, their beliefs, and reasons are in many cases significantly different than those of the tobacco companies.
Over the years the economic stability of the tobacco farmer has continued to decline while the tobacco companies have continued to flourish both domestically and internationally. There is no reason to believe that this scenario will change in the future, although the tobacco companies can be expected to continue to provide economic incentives to the growers to keep them allied with the companies' interests. Several examples support this conclusion of a continuing long-term decline in spite of tobacco company efforts to assure the farmers of economic stability. In 1969, U.S.-manufactured cigarettes contained 90% American grown tobacco. By the 1990's, that figure has dropped to barely 60%. The number of U.S. tobacco farms has also dropped dramatically, from 512,000 in 1954 to 124,000 in 1992. And the contribution that tobacco makes to the various tobacco producing states, though significant, has also been dropping. In North Carolina for example, tobacco's contribution to the economy has dropped from 11.3 % in 1960 to 7.8 % in 1993.
Farmers and tobacco allotment holders are increasingly aware of these realities. A 1997 survey of tobacco growers and tobacco allotment owners conducted by the Bowman Gray School of Medicine in North Carolina and the Center for Sustainable Systems in Berea, Kentucky found that over 70 % of the respondents have taken steps to learn about on-farm alternatives to tobacco. Fully 66 % have discovered that on-farm alternatives can be profitable. But the survey also noted important barriers. Between 64 % and 79 % of those surveyed said that few processing plants connecting farmers to consumers, lack of capital for new business ventures, no places to sell new products, and few low-interest loans or grants for new business ventures were just some of the barriers to change.
And finally, the poll indicated that 66% of those surveyed believed that the Federal government should actively help farmers find other ways of making a living.
Serious efforts to reduce the use and consumption of tobacco products in the United States must address the issue of the tobacco farmers, their families and the economic viability of their communities. Not unlike many smokers who know the dangers of tobacco but got seduced and "hooked" on the product and cannot quit, the American tobacco farmer and the economic infrastructures of tobacco states are and have been for a long time "tobacco dependent." They are a part of the deeply imbedded economic and political system that the tobacco companies have established and maintained to protect the companies' interests. In many of these communities tobacco is a way of life, often the only way of life, going back generations. As organizations concerned about public health and the general well being of our society we must be willing to recognize and accept our responsibilities in helping to reduce this dependence as part of our overall efforts to reduce tobacco use as a public health matter. The public health community, religious organizations and other civic organizations need to work cooperatively and collaboratively to effect positive change.
It is not enough to suggest that tobacco farmers merely transition to an alternative crop. There are complex issues that must be assessed before any short term or long term strategies are implemented, taking into account both domestic as well as international considerations. Tobacco production, size of plots, type of land, and product varies significantly from state to state. The public health community's role should be to provide the necessary vision and leadership and to serve as a catalyst for effecting the necessary short term and long term change that must occur in order for us to be successful in helping wean the tobacco farmer and their communities off their tobacco dependence. We must make the tobacco farmer, his family and his community a part of the "solution" not the problem. A significant side benefit in establishing a short term and long term plan to deal with these issues is that politically, the power of the tobacco companies can be significantly reduced, and that policy decisions could therefore be made that benefit public health and the tobacco growers rather than the tobacco industry. Tobacco state politicians and policy makers who have often carried out the agenda of the tobacco companies under the pretense of protecting their tobacco farming constituencies have in some ways done more harm than good in maintaining the "status quo." They also should begin to provide new visionary thinking and leadership for effecting change.
In discussions and dialogues with farmers, organizations representing the interests of the tobacco farmer as well as public health groups in the primary tobacco growing states, there is a cautious optimism that there can be productive solutions that seek to reduce tobacco use in this country as a major public health problem while at the same time working to ensure the economic viability and vitality of those states and those communities. But it must be stressed that finding the various options and implementing them will take time.
Intrinsically tied to the future fate of the tobacco farmer is what happens not only in the domestic growing arena but in the international growing, manufacturing and marketing arena as well. It is clear that agricultural production and marketing of tobacco is increasing world wide and that the quality of the crop in foreign countries is increasingly comparable to the quality of U.S. product -- often the result of assistance from U.S. companies and leaf dealers. American tobacco companies and leaf dealers are increasingly doing business in those countries including buying and importing foreign leaf into the United States, and pumping up the economies and dependency of those countries through intensifying investments. It makes good business sense for the companies but represents a serious threat to the health of the rest of the world as well as to the U.S. tobacco farmer. The high priority and attention that such companies as Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds are giving to the expansion of their international headquarters and operations out of Switzerland attest to their long term motives and plans. While the industry continues to provide the U.S. farmers "incentives" and "assurances" for staying in the business and remaining loyal to the tobacco companies it is clear that such commitments from the companies are transitory and can easily be abandoned or curtailed. We have a chance to change the "status quo" in a positive visionary way.
Whether or not there is an agreement or settlement with the tobacco companies, the public health community must now be willing to provide the leadership at the national, state and local level to assist in reshaping the agricultural systems and structures in the tobacco growing states. The tobacco farmers are not looking for handouts but looking for assistance and opportunities to make changes. This effort should be viewed as a five-to-ten year initiative and commitment.
Tobacco companies routinely predict that tobacco control measures, such as excise taxes or regulation by the Food and Drug Administration, will sacrifice vast numbers of jobs and cause other dire economic consequences. While a number of studies have found that these numbers are grossly inflated, communities economically dependent on tobacco manufacturing plants will no doubt suffer if the Committee's vision of reduced tobacco consumption becomes a reality. The Committee therefore calls for funds to cushion the transition to other work.
PENDING
The tobacco industry has shrewdly used philanthropy and sponsorship to its benefit. From donations to organizations that help homebound senior citizens to professional women's tennis to arts organizations, the industry donates money, services and other resources to a wide variety of organizations and causes. There is no exact ranking for arts benefactors, but Philip Morris is believed to be the largest corporate sponsor in the United States. According to a 1993 estimate, the company gives $15 million annually to support museums and the performing arts. The industry is also a major sports sponsor, spending an estimated $195 million on sports sponsorships in 1996.
Obviously, the industry benefits from its philanthropy and sponsorship, or else it wouldn't engage in such activities. Philanthropy and sports sponsorship builds relationships with decision-makers and citizens; allows the industry to portray itself as a good corporate citizen; provides another advertising outlet; and, most covertly, can buy either inaction towards tobacco- related issues or loyalty towards the industry on the part of the beneficiary. Given that, the industry's notable generosity towards women's, minority, arts and community service organizations is particularly shrewd. The industry positions itself as a valuable friend and sponsor of these worthy groups often in sore need of funds, and polishes its image by its link with groups promoting civil rights, social justice, and artistic freedom and innovation.
The blueprint calls for a ban on tobacco sponsorship and philanthropy to prevent tobacco companies from using them as tools to buy innocence by association and create new advertising outlets. However, the organizations abruptly cut off from such funding will no doubt suffer economically, which is why the Committee calls for compensation to such groups.
Australia has already instituted such a policy. The government taxes tobacco companies and directs the proceeds to state-level Health Promotion Foundations, which sponsor arts and sporting events.
According to the World Health Organization, tobacco use is estimated to have caused around 3 million deaths a year worldwide in the early 1990s, and is projected to cause ten million deaths a year worldwide by the 2020s or early 2030s, with 70 percent of those deaths occurring in developing countries. Many of these deaths will result from the increasingly aggressive marketing efforts of U.S.-based transnational tobacco companies.
The adoption of comprehensive national legislation governing tobacco will constitute a national finding that no civilized society can do less to stem the toll of disease and death from tobacco use. Since the marketing abuses which the U.S. seeks to control at home are practiced without restraint abroad -- by U.S.-based companies -- the U.S. government has both a public health and a moral obligation to do all within its power to see that the protections it extends to its own citizens are extended to all.
This must include adherence to the following principles:
The U.S.'s domestic actions on tobacco control will reverberate around the world. We should take care to enact no policies which undermine tobacco control efforts abroad or redirect the marketing aggression of U.S.-based tobacco companies abroad. Additionally, we are in a position to seize the opportunities created by the current strength of the tobacco control movement to help set a strong international standard.
A weak scheme of U.S. tobacco control regulation will be cited aggressively by tobacco lobbyists in other countries and international bodies as grounds for resisting stronger regulation, as unwarranted non-tariff trade barriers. Most important, any legislation which undercuts current FDA authority over tobacco products as addictive drugs will undermine efforts now underway in many countries to bring tobacco under drug regulatory laws and authorities. Since, in many areas of drug and food regulation, the U.S. FDA has become the world's standard setter, the U.S. is in a particularly strong position to help set world standards for tobacco product regulation, including the control of nicotine, tar, and additives.
Recognizing that U.S. constitutional limits may not allow the total bans on tobacco advertising and marketing now the law in some countries, and moving forward in others, U.S. domestic regulations on tobacco marketing and advertising should extend to the full reach of U.S. constitutional authority to limit unfair and deceptive practices.
Care must also be taken that the legal rights now held by tobacco's victims overseas to obtain redress against U.S.-based transnationals not be undercut by U.S. legislation.
Both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government can do much, within reason, to bring about worldwide adoption of tobacco manufacturing and marketing standards at least as comprehensive and stringent as those enforced within the United States. In the settlement negotiations, the transnational tobacco companies have accepted the legitimacy of stringent controls on tobacco manufacture, marketing and advertising. Seducing children to start an addictive product is just as wrong in China or Africa as it is in California or Alabama. So too, if cigarettes contain additives that make them even more harmful, they should not be sold anywhere with that additive or with an excessive level of nicotine. This is not just the United States attempting to impose its morality on other nations, but an effort to ensure that the conduct of U.S. corporations abroad is consistent with our domestic policies and national values. Of course, any attempt to enforce U.S. standards which leaves foreign tobacco companies -- and foreign subsidiaries or counterparts of U.S. companies free to continue business as usual -- raises questions of efficacy, as well as equal treatment. The problem is whether it is possible to achieve these goals as a matter of U.S. law.
For the physical attributes of the product itself, including its packaging, direct control can be achieved by applying U.S. laws to all products manufactured in this country, regardless of their destination. But the industry could, within a short period of time, circumvent that requirement by shifting the remainder of its manufacturing for foreign consumption abroad. Therefore, unless complemented by other means of enforcement, that approach would only result in a loss of jobs for U.S. tobacco farmers and workers in domestic cigarette manufacturing.
One answer is an excess profits-type tax imposed on export sales of cigarettes that do not comply with U.S. standards, even if they are in compliance with the laws of the country where the sale takes place, unless compliance with both laws is a physical impossibility (i.e., conflicting warning labels for packages). The tax would apply to all sales by U.S. companies or their subsidiaries and be made payable by the U.S. parent; for less than wholly-owned subsidiaries, the tax would be based on the U.S. parent's percentage of ownership. The level of the tax would be set based on an estimate of how much the company would have made if it had complied with U.S. laws (thereby driving down sales to minors and paying for damages inflicted by faulty products). The simplest form of tax would be an excise tax based on an amount per package or percentage of gross sales. It would also be necessary to make the tax payable on an annual basis, even if the profits were retained abroad, to prevent long term avoidance problems.
There are several possible objections to the tax approach. Since any "handicap" from the tax is to domestic not foreign companies, neither GATT nor tax treaties are likely to be a problem. Similarly, foreign makers will have an advantage in the marketplace (although the amount is unclear given the positive image of U.S. cigarettes and their higher quality and consistency), but that would be because the United States has made a policy choice for U.S. companies that selling cigarettes by any means possible is not acceptable conduct, just as if Congress decided it was improper to sell automatic rifles or machine guns abroad that are banned in this country. And if, as a result, U.S. companies sold off their foreign subsidiaries, at least Americans would not be responsible in any way for the harm that tobacco products inflict on others abroad. Of course, the tax could have the additional positive effect of increasing the incentive for the tobacco companies to lobby for adoption of U.S. standards abroad, thereby eliminating any advantage that foreign manufacturers might have.
In addition to the tax, any export of cigarettes bearing the "made in the USA" label that does not comply with U.S. health and safety laws could be clearly labeled with words to the effect that "this product does not comply with U.S. health and safety laws."
Action on Smoking and Health
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